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Abstract  
Open government has long been regarded as a pareto-efficient policy – after all, who could 
be against such compelling policy objectives as transparency, accountability, citizen 
engagement and integrity. This paper addresses why an authoritarian state would adopt a 
policy of open government, which seems counter-intuitive, and tracks its outworking by 
examining several facets of the policy in practice. The research uncovers evidence of insidious 
bureaucratic obstruction and an implementation deficit counter-posed with an outward-
facing political agenda to gain international respectability. The result is ‘half-open’ 
government in which the more benign elements have been adopted but the vested interests 
of government and business elites remain largely unaffected.  
 
Background 
Open government has been defined as ‘the extent to which citizens can monitor and influence 
government processes through access to government information and decision making 
arenas’ (Meijer et al, 2012:11). In a practical sense open government has long been promoted 
as a tool for development. The OECD, for example, sees it as ‘a driver of inclusive growth’ 
because it offers ‘broad citizen participation, plurality and a system of checks and balances 
which, in turn, provide better access to services’ (OECD, 2017: 42). Beyond the level of 
definition and principles that underpin open government, the literature is eclectic and tends 
to focus on individual components of the broader agenda. Hence there is research on: the 
social and economic value of opening (big) government data to the public, researchers, 
stakeholder’s bodies etc. (Janssen et al, 2012); the specific role which electronic government 
plays in the promotion of open government (Harrison et al, 2012); the role which social media 
can play in promoting greater openness, engagement and participation between government 
and citizens (Lee and Kwak, 2012); and, more direct forms of citizen engagement which moves 
beyond the ICT components of open government (Evans and Campos, 2013).  
The term ‘open government’ in the academic literature is most closely associated with 
freedom of information, anticorruption, and transparency (Nam, 2012). In the popular mind 
it is synonymous with former US President Obama’s Open Government Directive in 2009 
which focussed on how, via three principles, open government should work (Thorhildur et al, 
2013). First, using new technologies, government should be more transparent and provide 
information to citizens on what they are doing. Second, government should be participatory 
by engaging with citizens and, as a result, promote government effectiveness and 
improvement in the quality of the decision making process. Third, government should 
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collaborate across all levels of government and with non-profits and business (Wirtz and 
Birkmeyer, 2015).  
Open government is a new policy idea for authoritarian states and is now firmly on the policy 
agenda of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). 
There is limited research on the composite role which open government might play in 
authoritarian states. There is however research on individual elements of open government, 
usually in single country studies [on e-government: Kneuer and Harnisch, 2016; Maerz, 2016; 
on citizen engagement: Kasymova, 2017; Denhardt et al, 2009; on civil society: Knox and 
Yessimova, 2015; and, on improving public services: Marat, 2016; Janenova and Suk Kim, 
2016;], but no research on the overall impact of open government in authoritarian states.  
As a result, this paper has three aims. First, using a case study of Kazakhstan, we pose the 
obvious question, why would an authoritarian state be interested in adopting open 
government? Authoritarianism and openness are seemingly incongruous. Second, we 
examine facets of open government in practice as a way of gaining insights into how it is 
operationalized and implemented on the ground. Finally, we attempt to explain the 
implementation gap between the strategic priority to promote open government and its 
outworking. We conclude with some wider reflections on open government in post-Soviet 
authoritarian states. 
Open Government in Central Asia  
Central Asian countries perform poorly on Open Government metrics (see table 1). They are 
now being pressurised by international donors, populist movements within their borders, and 
people agitating through social media to move from opaque to open government. 
Kazakhstan, in particular, has reached a stage of development where the population 
increasingly demands, through periodic civil unrest ,more accountable and open government 
as a priority.  
 
Table 1: Open Government Indicators – Central Asia (2019) 
Country Freedom 
Status 
Political 
rights 
Civil liberties Freedom 
rating 
Aggregate 
score 
Denmark* Free 1 1 1.0 97 
Kazakhstan Not free 7 5 6.0 22 
Kyrgyzstan Partly free 5 4 4.5 38 
Tajikistan Not free 7 6 6.5 9 
Turkmenistan Not free 7 7 7.0 2 
Uzbekistan Not free 7 6 6.5 9 
Notes: 
*Denmark is included here for the purposes of comparison only 
 
Freedom status: average of a country’s political rights and civil liberties. This score determines 
freedom status where: free = 1.0 – 2.5; partly free = 3.0 – 5.0; and, not free = 5.5 – 7.0 
 
Political rights and civil liberties ratings: each rating is based on a scale of 1-7 where 1 represents the 
greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom. 
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Freedom rating: Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted political rights. They 
are ruled by authoritarian regimes, often with leaders or parties that originally took power by force 
and have been in office for decades. They may hold tightly controlled elections and grant a few 
political rights, such as some representation or autonomy for minority groups. 
Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no political rights because of severe 
government oppression, sometimes in combination with civil war. While some are draconian police 
states, others may lack an authoritative and functioning central government and suffer from extreme 
violence or rule by regional warlords. 
 
Aggregate score: 100 is the highest aggregate score and 0 the lowest. 
Source: Freedom in the World 2019: Freedom House 
 
Further, there is a strong central political imperative towards open government. Some Central 
Asian authoritarian leaders have issued top-down directives supportive of its principles, 
fearful that their authority is being threatened through greater citizen awareness and 
mobilisation. The increasing use of information technology and the spread of social media has 
seen citizens find channels to express their criticism of state practices. Despots are frightened 
of coloured revolutionary contagion associated with neighbouring countries such as Georgia, 
Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. Better to harness agitation through open 
government than suppress it. While there are examples of good open government practice 
emerging in some Central Asian countries, the omnipotent state is still the norm. In 
Kazakhstan, for example, the introduction of e-government has been successful in minimizing 
transactional arrangements between officials and citizens, reducing corruption opportunities, 
and improving public services (Brimkulov and Baryktabasov, 2018). World Bank indicators on 
government effectiveness, which include measurement of the quality of public services, 
testify to an improving situation (World Bank 2018). However, there are two points of note. 
First, open government as a reform initiative cannot be causally and exclusively linked to 
service improvements – other factors are at play. Civil servants receive better training, salaries 
are improving, and the introduction of public management has promoted a customer 
orientation. Second, open government in and of itself cannot move Central Asian countries 
classified as ‘not free’ to ‘free’. Again there are other factors which will impact on such a shift, 
including wider political and constitutional changes. There has also been research on the 
potential of open data to boost public sector innovations in Kazakhstan and support the 
emergence of civic engagement initiatives (Kassen, 2017; Knox and Janenova, 2018). 
Kyrgyzstan has witnessed an expansion of civil society and the growth of an independent 
media. Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asia country to be categorized as ‘partly free’ because 
of its commitment to democracy and modestly competitive party politics, although not 
without evidence of vote buying in elections. Tajikistan shows evidence of an expansion in 
the number and range of NGOs as service providers. Civil society remains weak and is largely 
reliant on state funding and grants from international donors. The state remains 
authoritarian, clientelist and patriarchal under President Rahmon who suppresses political 
opposition parties and appointed his son to the Office of Mayor of Dushanbe. The two least 
receptive countries to open government are Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan despite the 
former’s mantra of ‘from strong state to strong civil society’. Uzbekistan has entered a new 
political era following the death of its first president (Islam Karimov) and the election of 
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Shavkat Mirziyoyev who has promised a range of political and economic reforms. This includes 
initiatives like a ‘reach out to the people policy’ intended to offer a more inclusive form of 
governance. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, has made no efforts to democratize and is 
essentially a closed country – it scores lowest on the freedom ratings of all Central Asian 
countries (table 1). Those limited attempts which it makes to promote economic and political 
changes are aimed largely at the international community in an effort to attract foreign 
investment for industrial and infrastructure projects. Open Government, to a greater or lesser 
extent, is therefore being promoted as a policy within Central Asia, but embraced most 
strongly in Kazakhstan, our most likely case to which we now turn. 
Case Selection  
We take the case of Kazakhstan to investigate the implementation of open government in 
practice. Kazakhstan is an example of the case of the most likely variety (Eckstein 1975) – if 
open government is likely to succeed in any Central Asian authoritarian regime, it is most 
likely to do so in Kazakhstan. The Republic of Kazakhstan is one of five Central Asian states 
that gained independence from Russia in 1991. It is the largest economy in the Central Asian 
region, having risen from a lower middle to upper middle-income country (GDP per capita, 
current $8,800) in just two decades as a result of its large natural resources (oil, fossil fuels 
and precious metals such as uranium where it is the world’s largest producer). This over 
reliance on natural resources and a fluctuating demand for oil means Kazakhstan has been 
attempting to diversify it economy. It has geo-political significance in that it links Chinese 
markets and South Asia, on the one hand, and Russia and Western Europe on the other. It 
will, for example, be part of the Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative that aims to connect 
Asia, Africa and Europe.  
 
But why would an authoritarian regime want to adopt open government as a strategic 
priority? It seems counter-intuitive. Kazakhstan craves international respectability. Despite 
being an authoritarian state, it wants to be seen as a serious actor on the world stage. For 
example, it works closely with the OECD, spending large amounts of money on technical 
support from their experts with the ultimate aim of becoming an OECD member state. The  
OECD, in turn, has noted that Kazakhstan’s government ‘has expressed a strong interest in 
enhancing transparency, openness, accountability and participation in policy making in order 
to further develop public trust in government and improve the quality of public services’. 
(OECD, 2017: 17) The first President has therefore promoted open government as a strategic 
priority in the Plan for the Nation (100 Concrete Steps), and part of a solution to ensure 
Kazakhstan is among the top thirty countries in the world by 2050. To do this, it needs, based 
on advice from the OECD, to enforce a root-and-branch reform process, which includes 
embracing open government principles and practice (Knox, 2019). In an authoritarian regime 
where appointments are at the behest of the President, policy makers need to own the 
objectives of the regime. For example, The Minister for Information and Communication of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dauren Abayev, stated:  
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Open government is a unique step of our state towards the democratization of 
society. Can you imagine that we will now be obliged to publish all budgets of the state 
bodies? Each of you can visit the official web-sites and see the budgets of the state 
bodies. Except for certain data, classified as "secret", all other data are open. 
(Mosunov, 2017).  
Many of its formal public policies must ‘read well’ in the international arena. Kazakhstan is a 
member of the United Nations, the first Central Asian country to join, and was elected as non-
permanent member of the UN Security Council (2017-18). Kazakhstan is a member of the 
OSCE. It maintains cordial relations with the Islamic world and has chaired the Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation. It became a member of the WTO in 2015, hosted Expo in 2017, a major 
world-wide future energy event, and has facilitated or mediated peace building talks on 
international conflicts (Russia and the Ukraine; Russia and Turkey; and Syria). All of which is 
part of an agenda of international approbation in which open government is an important 
element. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
So, if open government is a strategic priority for Kazakhstan how has it been implemented on 
the ground? In order to structure the collection and analysis of data we draw on a body of 
work conducted by the OECD (2016 & 2017) on open government reforms which considers 
the principles of open government, policies to operationalize these principles, and its short 
and long term impact. We summarise the framework in table 2. We use this as an evaluative 
framework against which we assess the role played by bureaucrats in implementing open 
government. Hence, the authors interrogated participants in the research on the extent to 
which open government policies (set out in table 2) were being successfully implemented in 
Kazakhstan and their role as officials therein. 
Table 2: Operationalising Open Government (OECD) 
Principles of Open 
Government 
Open Government Policies Impact of Open 
Government 
 Citizen engagement 
 Transparency 
 Accountability 
 Integrity 
 Stronger civil society 
 More inclusive decision making 
 Access to information (law and practice) 
 Freedom of the Press 
 Access to public services (e-government; 
open portal; service to citizens initiatives) 
 Anti-corruption measures 
Short term: 
 Better quality 
public services  
Longer term: 
 Quality of 
democracy 
 Inclusive growth 
 Trust in 
government 
 Rule of law 
 
We draw on multiple sources of primary data to examine the implementation of open 
government in Kazakhstan.  
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(a) Senior Officials: two focus groups were conducted with government officials in 
Kazakhstan. The first group comprised Corpus A or political elite civil servants holding 
the positions of general secretaries and vice-ministers, and akims (appointed regional 
governors).  Focus group participants were selected to reflect a range of political and 
official representatives across a range of ministries. This was a purposive sample with 
participants chosen because of their involvement in rolling out facets of open 
government. The first focus group took place at Nazarbayev University, Astana, 
Kazakhstan in October 2017 and comprised 35 representatives, many more than the 
authors anticipated. Attendance reflected the convenience of the venue since all 
Ministries are located in Astana and the political significance of the topic. Officials 
want to be openly interested in policies of the President. A second focus group took 
place at the General Prosecutor’s office in Kazakhstan (December 2017), a body 
known to be reformist with a very dynamic leader where twelve elite level bureaucrats 
were asked their views on the success of the open government agenda in Kazakhstan. 
(b) Non-governmental organisations (NGOs): two further focus groups were held with 
NGO representatives and public councils. These were conducted in public buildings in 
one of the regional capitals. The purpose of public councils is ‘the public expression of 
civil society views on matters of public concern’ (Article 3 of the Law on Public Councils 
in Kazakhstan). The public council focus group (n = 18 participants) was asked to 
identify their role perceptions in terms of more inclusive decision making on the part 
of the government. The NGO focus group (n= 8 participants) was asked about the role 
of civil society in Kazakhstan and whether this constituted greater receptivity and 
openness on the part of government to their views.  
(c) Observation: In December 2017 the researchers observed a public meeting of a 
project entitled Open Canal (in Kazakh “Ashyk Arna”). The aims of this project are 
three-fold: to improve the level of public awareness on the instruments and 
mechanisms provided by the open government; to involve expert community and 
NGOs into the open government and increase its demand; and, to develop 
recommendations on improvement of public policy.  
(d) Elite Interviews: Interviews were held with six regional Mayors and Deputy Mayors, 
fifteen directors and senior managers within the General Prosecutors Office, four from 
the Civil Service and Anti-Corruption Agency, and three from the Ministry for Civil 
Society and Religious Affairs.  These interviewees were conducted to gather primary 
data on access to public services, and anti-corruption measures. 
(e) Content analysis of legislation and the open government portal: Relevant legislation 
and accompanying news media were analysed, coded by open government indicators 
and incorporated into the study. The open government portal in Kazakhstan 
(https://data.egov.kz) was analysed in terms of its content, quality of information, and 
extent of use by the citizens and government bodies.     
Given the volume of data generated in two languages (Russian and Kazakh) and the high costs 
of translation, transcription into English was selective. The researchers used text data content 
7 
 
analysis (sentiment analysis) available in Excel with open government indicators as nodal 
points and captured evaluative feedback on how the policy was being implemented in 
practice. Qualitative data analysis software such as NVivo is not available in the Russian 
language, and Kazakh was used intermittently during focus groups and interviews. 
Open Government Implementation 
We report on the implementation of open government under headings in the OECD 
evaluative framework set out in table 2 (column 2). 
Stronger civil society  
Kazakhstan witnessed a rapid growth in non-governmental organizations. At their height 
numbers exceeded 30,000, of which 18,000 were registered as NGOs (Knox and Yessimova, 
2015). Today, however, only 8,300 NGOs remain active. State officials introduced a law 
entitled On State Social Order, Grants and Bonuses for NGOs (2015) which radically changed 
the relationship between the state and NGO sector. Up until then, NGOs were able to access 
funding from a variety of donors: international organizations, private donations, through 
delivering public services and consultancy fees. The new law has significantly restricted access 
to funding other than from state sources through grants and competing for ‘social orders’ 
(delivery of public/social services) on a competitive basis. Bureaucrats justified this clamp-
down on foreign grants because of what they described as corruption amongst NGO leaders, 
and lack of transparency and accountability in spending foreign donor monies. The leader of 
one prominent NGO commented on this as follows: 
In the past NGOs received foreign funding from different international organizations. 
We had several cases when heads of the NGOs misused grant funding for their 
personal interests rather than public interests. I think this law on grants to the NGOs 
has changed the situation when only active NGOs, those who can demonstrate 
through their performance and results, are getting social grants. The rest will 
disappear.              
All NGO funding, government and international donors, is now channelled through a joint 
stock company Centre for Support of Civic Initiatives which is controlled by officials in the 
Ministry for Religious Affairs and Civil Society. NGOs must be registered in the Ministry’s 
electronic database to become eligible for state funding and entitled to receive bonuses 
awarded by government to those NGOs which have successfully implemented social projects. 
The new law government on civil society also exerts bureaucratic control on the type of NGOs 
and spheres of activities deemed to be appropriate for the development of Kazakhstan. Hence 
Article 5 of the law stipulates the provision of state social orders, grants and bonuses in the 
areas of: education and science; physical culture and sports; healthy lifestyle; environmental 
protection; support to the youth and children’s projects; support to the vulnerable groups 
and unemployed; protection of historical cultural heritage; and, strengthening national unity. 
All seemingly worthy causes but benign. Conspicuous by their absence are NGOs active on 
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issues of public participation in policy-making, promoting government accountability and 
transparency, fighting corruption, and human rights.  
The leader of a local NGO shared his concerns in the following way:  
As we have to apply for state funding, we are no longer independent. We cannot be 
considered as ‘non-governmental organizations’, we are pro-governmental as the only 
source of finance is the government. I doubt that corruption is now less with the 
funding regime for the NGOs. Decisions and power on allocation of funding is now in 
the hands of the Ministry.      
So, while NGOs willingly accept there were a limited number of cases of corruption and 
misuse of funding in the third sector, they accuse officials of intentionally perverting the open 
government agenda to: exert exclusive control over their funding; dictate the benign priority 
public policy areas in which they can be active; and, placing them in an invidious position 
which muzzles any hint of independent criticism about public services provision. 
More inclusive decision-making 
There have been three main policies adopted by the Kazakhstan Government to promote 
greater citizen inclusion in the decision making process: the open government portal; open 
dialogue; and open budgets. The open government portal provides an opportunity for citizens 
to participate in the discussion of drafts of normative legal acts through the platform Open 
Legislation (https://legalacts.egov.kz/). It was designed to ensure the accessibility of draft 
legislation to stakeholders and the general public. At the time of writing (February 2019) there 
are over 15,000 drafts of legal acts posted on this platform, an indication of the highly 
legalised framework through which officials implement public policies. Yet this voluminous 
legal repository on the open government portal has attracted only 415 posts. It would be easy 
to conclude that the turgid nature of legalese on this portal is a turn-off for the average 
citizen, except that a number of the policies to which the legislation refers have resulted in a 
public outcry via social media networks. For example, the draft Pension Law in 2013 which 
increased women’s retirement age for from 58 to 63 witnessed heated debates on social 
media (Maltseva and Janenova, 2018). The new amendment to the land code in 2016 on long-
term leasing of agricultural land to the foreign countries attracted significant protests from a 
mobilised public, and as a result, was eventually postponed (Bacchi, 2016). Citizen registration 
was introduced into law in January 2017 placing a responsibility on property owners to 
register people residing in their houses, ostensibly to combat extremism. Citizens must now 
register with local authorities if they move within the country and remain in one locality for 
more than a month. One well-known lawyer, Dzhokhar Utebekov, compared the new rules to 
‘serfdom’ and using the law for greater monitoring and control of citizens (Omirgazy, 2017:1).  
Another component of the open government portal is Open Dialogue 
(https://dialog.egov.kz/), the aim of which is to encourage a dialogue between the citizen and 
the state. The main goal of the portal is ‘to involve citizens in the activities of state bodies’. 
Users can directly submit an appeal and send proposals to a specific state body or local 
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akimat, report on the quality of the mobile cell network, and participate in social surveys. The 
on-line nature of this provision is intended to facilitate citizens’ inputs across the huge 
geography that is Kazakhstan, avoid queuing to access basic information on public services, 
and raise awareness about compliance issues amongst the population. Open Dialogue offers 
three main services: blog-platforms of the heads of the central and local government bodies; 
internet conferences; and, survey polls. Compared to participation in Open Legislation, 
citizens express much higher interest and activity in writing on the blogs of ministers and 
mayors (akims). Each blog is coordinated by a moderator from the relevant state body, and 
the comments and questions of the citizens may or may not appear on these blogs which is 
subject to approval by the state moderator. The language of communication from the 
government side remains highly bureaucratic and impenetrable to the average citizen.  One 
focus group participant described it as follows: 
Open Dialogue has good intentions but its effectiveness often depends on the 
personalities of ministers or akims and the gate-keeping role of site moderators. Even 
for active state representatives, it can be a publicity tool to boost their image for 
political progression. 
The Open Budgets portal (https://budget.egov.kz/) was created to promote citizen inputs, 
monitoring and feedback on how public bodies spend budget funds. The law of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan On Access to Information (16 November 2015 No.401-V) introduced new 
responsibilities on government bodies to publish their budgets on the web-sites (Article 16). 
The Open Budgets portal should publish draft budget programs before they are approved, 
giving people the opportunity to participate in an open discussion on the draft budget. 
However, these legal requirements are not implemented in practice. The government bodies 
either do not publish budget information or publish them in an unfriendly format which is 
difficult for citizens to access and understand (Moldabekov, 2016). According to the Open 
Budget Survey 2017, Kazakhstan received: 
 A score of 53 score out of 100 in terms of transparency (Open Budgets Index) and was 
deemed to ‘provide the public with limited budget information’. 
 A score of 13 score out of 100 for public participation in budget planning and 
therefore ‘provides few opportunities for the public to engage in the budget process’. 
 A score of 63 score out of 100 for budget oversight by legislature and audit indicating 
that ‘the legislature and supreme audit institution in Kazakhstan provide adequate 
oversight of the budget. 
(Source: International Budget Partnership, 2017). 
 
The head of the NGO Centre for Support of Legal and Economic Reforms commented in this 
regard:  
Not all Akimats (Mayors) publish annual reports on the execution of the region's 
budget. Now the draft annual budget execution report for 2016 is only posted on the 
website of the Akimat of East Kazakhstan region. Eleven out of sixteen Akimats did not 
publish even the accounts for 2015 (Gareyeva, 2017:2). 
10 
 
In summary, while bureaucrats can point to a number of fora for more inclusive decision 
making, the inaccessible legalese that constitutes the open legislation portal, the gatekeeping 
role exercised by officials in the open dialogue platform, and the lack of compliance in open 
budgeting, respectively, amount to tacit resistance to the principles of open government.  
 
Access to information (law and practice) 
The Law on Access to Information (2015) stipulates the rights of journalists to receive 
information from the government through oral, written request or email requests. In practice, 
this norm is ignored or frustrated as government bodies demand journalists’ requests to be 
on official paper and delay providing answers. Focus group participants highlighted several 
problems related to accessing information, including low level of responsibility of the 
government bodies to involve the public and limited participation by citizens. As the 
representative of the Ministry for Information and Communication described it:  
There are cases when state bodies simply do not respond to the proposals of the 
population or respond illiterately. Our ministry is working on this and, in particular, 
the requirements for assessing the effectiveness of state bodies with regard to their 
involvement of the public will be increased.  
A representative from the ‘Open Canal’ project noted that the law on Access to Information 
was neither informative nor comprehensible for ordinary citizens. He commented:  
This law is just about access to information, which is primarily addressed to the public, 
so that people, after reading the law, can understand how you can get this information 
from any government body. But the law does not work because there are many formal 
reasons for refusal. Procedures are unclear on: how the drafts of normative acts 
should be published; how they should be discussed; and, what rights citizens have.  
The deputy of the Parliament as a key speaker at the ‘Open Canal’ meeting expressed his 
disappointment: ‘The state bodies of Kazakhstan do not respond willingly to the calls of 
citizens, not to mention the execution of the law On Access to Information’.  In short, 
bureaucrats frustrate both the spirit and letter of the law on access to information through 
delays on time-sensitive issues or draw on a host of reasons for refusing access. They play a 
role of passive non-compliance and hide behind convoluted legal terminology in the Act to 
justify non-disclosure. 
Freedom of the press 
Recent amendments to the law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, ‘On Mass Media’, adopted in 
December 2017, risk limiting civic participation and creating a repressive rather than open 
government culture. Article 21, for example, obliges journalists to receive consent from any 
legal person to disseminate personal, family, medical, banking, commercial and other 
sensitive information in the media. Under these terms any unethical and corrupt behaviour 
of civil servants can be potentially hidden. Journalists require the permission of officials to 
report unethical conduct which may include: holidays in expensive resorts around the world, 
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family members of officials possessing luxury apartments and expensive cars, and transfer of 
large funds to personal accounts in foreign banks. Specifically, the new legislative norms 
restrict the rights of journalists and citizens to freedom of information about the actions and 
conduct of government officials. In case of a breach of these rules, the owner of the mass 
media outlet, chief editor, journalists and authors of the materials will be held responsible by 
the criminal court.  As one journalist asked rhetorically: 
The situation is ludicrous. Do you think as a journalist I am going to receive advance 
permission from an official to report on his/her extravagant lifestyle which appears 
inconsistent with his/her earnings? 
Repressive measures have increased against independent media outlets. For example, 
criminal investigations were conducted in spring 2018 on two prominent media outlets 
Ratel.kz and Forbes Kazakhstan. Citizens have therefore found their voice through social 
media. One research participant noted: 
In the absence of press freedom, social media has filled the vacuum. At first officials 
did not know how to respond. They were like rabbits caught in headlights (in Russian: 
как запуганный зверь). As ‘press freedom’ heralded greater restrictions on 
journalists, social media activity increased. Now state officials are finding ways to 
control its spread and influence. 
As the power of social media has become a threat to the political and bureaucratic elite, they 
have found new ways to control it. New legislative amendments were enacted in January 
2018 which prohibit the anonymity of bloggers and social network commentators. The 
government legitimizes these changes as a response to terrorism and extremism intended to 
protect the public. Kazakhstani citizens are able to post a comment on any news or media 
articles only after authorization through a digital signature or SMS-message.  
Access to public services  
The government’s tendency to monopolize and centralize state control has been 
demonstrated in public service provision. In 2016 a new State Corporation Government for 
Citizens was established to provide all public services, based on Canada’s Service First and 
Australia’s Centrelink initiatives, The State Corporation delivers over 700 public services on 
behalf of the government bodies and public sector organizations through multiple channels: 
over 300 Public Service Centers (or One Stop Shops); e-government portal (http://egov.kz/); 
and call-centres with a free phone number. The so-called Situational Centre was introduced 
since 2012 to monitor and observe actions and operations of all employees (over 10,000) 
working in the public service centres and call-centre. The system has cameras with video and 
audio recording which provides information on a daily basis from the regions to the central 
office in Astana. This allows central-level managers to monitor statistics on the number of 
customers waiting in the queue, number of processed documents, and the number of 
complaints in the online system. The Situational Centre also allows officials to listen to the 
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conversations in any of the public service centres, for example, exchanges between a client 
and a front-line employee, or managers and subordinates.  
The senior manager of the State Corporation explains the benefits of this system in the 
following way:  
The Situational Centre helps us to conduct monitoring over the quality of public 
service delivery in an effective way. It allows us to identify problems, for example, 
there is a long queue in the remote regional public service centre…so we are able to 
track and address these situations immediately, and punish those employees who are 
not disciplined, impolite or miss deadlines of documents review. 
The focus of these interventions has been on monitoring performance and behaviours of 
employees – employees do the same jobs as before, yet the state use technology to monitor 
the actions of frontline officials.  
A similar example relates to new legislative measures introduced in December 2016 requiring 
citizens to register at their place of residence (Legislative Acts on Countering Extremism and 
Terrorism). The main objective of registering citizens was to monitor the flow of internal 
migration and, in response, plan public services to meet changing population needs in 
education, employment, medical care and so on. The secondary purpose was to enhance 
security and reduce risks of terrorism. This led to a significant increase in migration police and 
home ‘inspections’. Human rights activists have raised concerns about corruption amongst 
migration police particularly against vulnerable and disadvantaged migrants. As one research 
participant noted: 
The whole citizen registration process has been a ruse. What began as a legitimate 
reason for its introduction, planning better public services and citizens protection, has 
turned into a mechanism to track people’s movements and activities. No wonder trust 
in government intentions is low. Officials pretend to do one thing but have malign 
intentions. It is all about monitoring and control. 
Anti-corruption measures 
Kazakhstan, like other Central Asian countries, is dogged by corruption despite a raft of 
legislative measures which have been put in place and several high profile criminal convictions 
against senior officials and ministers in government. As part of a wider preventative strategy 
and to acknowledge that corruption is rife amongst certain ministries, the Kazakhstan 
government introduced an ethics code enforced by newly appointed ethics commissioners (in 
January 2016) with aim of raising standards in public life. Commissioners’ primary 
responsibility under the new law was to ensure ‘compliance of civil servants with the 
legislation in the areas of civil service, anti-corruption and the code of ethics’. This initiative 
received strong political endorsement from the President of Kazakhstan. The reality of their 
work has been somewhat different. Commissioners have been appointed from within the 
existing ranks of officials and their roles highly circumscribed by superiors, many of whom do 
13 
 
not want cases of unethical behaviour or corruption exposed in their ministries. As one 
research participant pointed out:  
The management will not allow big scandals and violations to leak out. Even if an 
ethics commissioner raises an ethical offense, top management can close down this 
topic at the beginning. So, many civil servants do not complain, because they do not 
believe at the outset that the problem will be solved. 
The job of commissioners has also been denigrated to one of whistle-blowers in a system 
where loyalty and patronage are highly valued. Instead senior managers use commissioners 
to diffuse personnel issues in their ministries. 
Discussion 
So, what explains the gap between the strategic priority of the President in promoting open 
government in Kazakhstan and its outworking as evidenced by the above qualitative data? 
We suggest there are two key explanatory causes: bureaucratic obstruction and an 
implementation deficit which we expand on in this discussion section. 
Bureaucratic obstruction 
There are three key factors which explain how Kazakh officials subverted strategic priorities 
of the state. First, in circumstances where there is a low degree of political trust amongst the 
population, then there is likely to be a high degree of administrative power. In Kazakhstan, 
people do not trust the political system but place unstinting trust in the President. Equally, as 
a society, Kazakhs have strong family values and place less reliance on the role of government. 
Peters (2018: 66) describes these circumstances as ‘the population is less willing to accept the 
decrees of government than the needs of the family or the guidance of the local patron. In 
these cases, the bureaucracy may be required to step in to fill a power vacuum in the political 
system’. Second, the near monopoly hold on political power by the President’s political party 
(Nur Otan) and its influence on the bureaucracy makes civil service neutrality impossible.  
Citizens complain about poor public services to Nur Otan rather than to bureaucrats. Third, 
the confluence of strong institutions (bureaucracy and political party) and their combined 
interests in maintaining opaque government makes their capacity to subvert strategic 
Presidential priorities strong. 
At the highest levels of the Kazakhstan government, ministers and akims are appointed by 
the President and senior officials are also key figures in a largely one party (Nur Otan) state, 
even though tokenistically smaller political parties exist. Ministers are frequently reshuffled 
and during this process bring with them a cadre of ‘loyal’ officials who have earned their trust. 
This governance system means that the civil service is highly politicized including the 
appointment of a number of political civil servants whose role is to ensure party policy is 
enforced. The boundaries between senior officials in the President’s political party, ministerial 
and akims appointments, political civil servants and the senior officials (Corps A civil servants) 
are seamless.  There is a free transfer market between these elites, despite the charade of 
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merit based recruitment to Corps A officials. In that sense it seems counter-intuitive that the 
wishes of the President on open-government could be subverted by the ministers and civil 
servants either directly appointed or selected through a ‘merit based’ system. However, this 
fails to recognise the power of the political, official and business elites in Kazakhstan whose 
interests would be undermined by greater openness. A stronger civil society offers an 
alternative voice for citizen complaints, open budgeting provides opportunities to challenge 
resource distribution, access to information may uncover evidence to confront government 
decisions and highlight corrupt practices in areas like public procurement, bribery and rent 
seeking. So, while the virtues of having a political civil service in some Western societies are 
promoted as ways to ensure the electoral mandates of politicians are faithfully implemented 
(Peters and Pierre, 2004), in post-Soviet societies this arrangement may provide a bulwark to 
protect political and administrative elites rather than as a means of implementing strategic 
priorities which they see as threatening the status quo.  
While there is overt bureaucratic obstruction at the senior echelons of the civil service, mid-
career officials tacitly resist for several reasons. The volatility of the system at the top means 
that the public policy context in which they exist is in a constant state of flux and stated 
policies are rarely implemented, still less evaluated. As a result, there is no institutional 
memory on which to build on successes or learn from failures. The middle tier of the civil 
service also lacks capacity, is poorly paid, work long and unproductive hours and, by its nature, 
resists change in the bureaucratic process (Janenova and Knox, 2018). They operate in a 
system that punishes failure and prefers the comfort of pre-existing procedures and 
processes. Changing to an open government culture would represent a major cultural shift, 
taking risks, and affirmative signals from the top that changes were sanctioned. Without this, 
there is systemic but tacit resistance to open government. Overall, Peters (2018: 224) 
describes these circumstances as the dual hierarchy of party and bureaucracy which ‘can be 
used to ensure the compliance and control of the civil service’ in two ways: firstly, the party 
provides ideological guidance which the civil service internalizes, and second, the party acts 
as a check on the performance of the officials who may deviate from the ideology of opaque 
government.  
Aside from the porous boundaries between political party and the bureaucracy of the state, 
the association with key business interests also plays a part. Peters (2018) refers to this as a 
‘parantela relationship’ involving kinship ties between the business sector as a pressure group 
and political party that advocates their interests in the bureaucracy. He describes this as 
pressure groups ‘developing some feeling of consanguinity’ with the political party that 
indirectly gives them significant policy influence in the civil service (Peters, 2018: 183). Open 
government is unlikely to serve the interests of these pressure groups. 
Implementation deficit 
Given the scale of Kazakhstan and low population density, realizing open government across 
a diverse geographical space poses significant implementation problems. Although 
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Kazakhstan has a highly centralized system of governance, regional Akims as Presidential 
appointees have significant power. Their distance from the centre of government might 
suggest greater local influence to comply with strategic priorities and some policy discretion 
in so doing. However, Akims represent both the interests of the bureaucracy and the political 
party at the regional level. Hence, they ‘conspire’ to create an implementation deficit in the 
President’s strategic priority for open government, a situation in which passive citizens who 
may not fully realize its potential unwittingly acquiesce.  
Implementation is also affected by policy ambiguity. Open government as a concept is poorly 
understood. The OECD framework, which we use in this paper to operationalize the principles 
of open government, is multi-faceted and could give rise to principal-agent problems. To what 
extent will senior officials be motivated, for example, to actively implement anti-corruption 
measures when they are complicit in practice? Moreover, do all the policies outlined in the 
framework (civil society, more inclusive decision making, access to information, freedom of 
the press, and anti-corruption measures) contribute equally to securing open government? 
This makes open government an ambiguous policy. 
Matland’s analysis (1995) of the impact of conflict and ambiguity on policy implementation is 
useful in conceptualizing the failure of open government in Kazakhstan. Matland suggests a 
matrix comprising two dimensions of policy (see table 3), one that indicates a high/low degree 
of ambiguity and, as a consequence, offers room for high/low discretion in implementation, 
respectively. Ambiguity tends to make discretion more likely. The second dimension is the 
extent to which a policy provokes conflict. The degree of conflict will depend on whether 
there are very explicit and clear losers should the policy be implemented.  
Table 3: Impact of conflict and ambiguity upon implementation 
Adapted from Matland’s Analysis (1995) 
 Low Conflict High Conflict 
Low Ambiguity Administrative Implementation Political Implementation 
High Ambiguity Experimental Implementation Symbolic Implementation: 
Open Government in Central Asia 
 
Conflict, according to Hill (2013: 217) ‘implies a desire to control. Actors claiming hierarchical 
rights will seek to assert them’. So, an open government policy may be an agreed strategic 
priority for Kazakhstan but one which includes greater press freedom and could therefore 
expose the excesses of bureaucrats and politicians, hence a high conflict policy. Matland 
argued that high ambiguity, high conflict policies will result in ‘symbolic implementation’ 
where no effort is expended in giving effect to a policy. But officials and politicians, in the case 
of open government, may simply want to claim to the President and international 
organisations that they have tried. 
One of the outcomes of policies which are characterized as ‘high ambiguity-high conflict’ is 
that local level coalitional strength determines outcomes. How the policy is implemented is 
determined, according to Matland, by the coalition of stakeholders at the local level who have 
16 
 
direct influence over resource allocation. There may be competing coalitions who contest 
different interpretations of an open government policy that is ambiguous. As Matland argued: 
‘when a policy has a referent goal and ambiguous means…the coalitional strength at the micro 
level, not at the macro level, determines the implementation outcome’ (Matland, 1995: 170). 
In the case of open government, coalitions of interest comprising local level Akims, 
bureaucrats, and the business elite conspire to thwart implementation. 
Additional factors that influence implementation of open government, drawing on the 
conceptual framework developed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) and refined by Hill 
(2013), include the following:  
 Policy characteristics: open government may be seen as a Western model that fails to 
acknowledge the legacy of Soviet history on independent states like Kazakhstan. 
Opaque and unresponsive government are the norm. 
 Layers in the policy transfer process: Kazakhstan has a huge public sector with multiple 
state, arms-length, state owned enterprises and an underdeveloped private sector. 
Policy implementation in this diffuse structural morass will always prove difficult. 
 Horizontal inter-organisation relationships: ministerial fiefdoms are carefully guarded 
as they can dictate the fate of political careers and discourage cross-cutting policy 
issues such as open government. Government is vertical and ministers are most 
interested in attracting the favourable attention of the President. 
 Factors affecting responses by implementing agencies: there are few politicians or 
senior bureaucrats championing open government as an strategic priority, still less 
street level workers who find the concept highly ambiguous and its relevance for the 
daily lives of Kazakhstani citizens tangential. 
 Responses from those affected by the policy: the most obvious manifestation in a 
practical sense for citizens of Kazakhstan is access to public services through electronic 
government. Other facets of open government are too abstract in their hierarchy of 
needs. 
 Wider macro-environmental factors: politicians and senior bureaucrats buy-into the 
concept of symbolic implementation in their collective quest for the international 
approbation of Kazakhstan and its goal of becoming one of the top thirty developed 
countries by 2050. 
 
We summarise these two explanations for ‘open-government’ in Kazakhstan (see figure 1). 
Figure 1: Half-Open Government in Kazakhstan 
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Conclusions 
We conclude that the government of Kazakhstan was never truly committed to the merits of 
open government and hence is engaging in this agenda for the purposes of international 
optics, consistent with their declared intentions to become one of the top 30 developed 
countries by 2050. This being the case, why would bureaucrats bother to develop various laws 
and policy instruments to give effect to open government if their intentions were merely 
symbolic implementation? It may be that they began with a genuine desire to implement the 
will of the President on open government and when they realised how its full import would 
threaten their interests, they thwarted its implementation. Open government is now 
perceived as a threat to the bureaucratic elite who have subverted attempts to make their 
actions transparent and their activities accountable. The outworking of open government 
alarmed bureaucrats who reverted to a command, control and punish mentality inherited 
from their Soviet roots. This alarm has several causes: bureaucrats witnessed bottom-up 
social unrest and feared a colour revolution (contagion from neighbouring countries); their 
power-base was being scrutinised and challenged, including their personal lifestyles and 
behaviours; and, they were uncomfortable or not used to listening to the views of, and having 
to respond to, the public who transitioned from being passive to active citizens. More 
generally, change can be threatening. When that change is, in part, motivated by Western-
inspired principles (isomorphic mimicry), bureaucrats reverted to type - stronger control and 
monitoring, a comfort zone in which they are well practiced. Comparing Central Asian 
countries on their open government performance may seem like measuring developing 
countries with very different political ideologies against Western liberal democratic 
standards. In the case of Kazakhstan, however, its self-declared strategic goal, to become one 
of the top fifty developed countries, makes such a comparison reasonable. If this example of 
embracing open government is true of Kazakhstan, then other Central Asian countries, some 
with more repressive regimes, may well experience similar problems. Open government in 
• International 
approbation
• Aim to join OECD 
countries
Why Open 
Government
• Bureaucratic 
subversion
• High ambiguity and 
high conflict policy
Symbolic 
Implementation • E-Government
• Open Portal: 
service to citizens
Half-Open 
Government
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Kazakhstan may have been the President’s intention, bureaucratic obstruction, symbolic 
implementation and half-open government is the reality.  
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